PARTICIPATION AND DISINTERMEDIATION IN A RISK SOCIETY
Robert J. Rhee †

Humanity has always lived in the shadow of catastrophic risk. The common
definition of catastrophe is “a momentous tragic event ranging from extreme
misfortune to utter overthrow or ruin.”1 A catastrophe connotes a large, broadly
distributed loss. Frequency of event and severity of loss are inversely correlated.
Severe losses are infrequent, but they may still be within the range of expectation.
Highly destructive terrorist attacks, hurricanes, and earthquakes are certainly
foreseeable. Most catastrophes are also localized events. Despite great misfortune,
they do not significantly affect the broader society, economy or even the
insurance industry. But there is a category of catastrophes that surpass ordinary
expectations. An extreme catastrophe (mega-catastrophe) is an event so severe
that the exogenous shock ripples out from the immediate locus of loss to the
greater society. These events test the traditional network of compensation and
insurance schemes.
The problem is one of distributing risk and loss. Important questions are
raised. Who should bear the risk? How should compensation be conceived? What
should be the mechanism for risk distribution? The answers depend, in large part,
on the number of participants in the distribution scheme and the cost associated
with risk spreading.2 In the case of extreme catastrophes, the major participants
are victims, insurers, and government.3 The availability of private insurance is
limited by the capital held and the degree to which parties have contracted for risk
transfer. When capital cannot support the risk or when insurance penetration is
insufficient, government compensation fills the void and provides disaster relief,
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either through ex ante insurance or ex post compensation. Without public relief,
the residual risk bearer is always the victim.
In most cases of loss or accident, the mix of cost internalization and
compensation through the network of traditional insurance, tort action,
government relief, social and familial institutions works fairly well. This scheme,
however, is stressed when losses become extreme: cost internalization may be
deemed too much for a large class of victims; traditional insurance may not have
sufficient capacity to absorb the loss; the tort system may be too slow and costly
and may increase the secondary costs of dislocation; ordinary government
services, social and familial institutions may become overwhelmed. The standard
model of compensation was tested by two of the most devastating catastrophes to
strike the United States in modern history—9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. These
catastrophes raise important questions about the adequacy of participation in a
risk society and the role of the government. Is there a right mix of risk spreading
among participants? Is there an efficient matching of those exposed to risk with
those who are willing to bear the cost? What are the costs of risk spreading?
Poorly managed risk can not only amplify the consequences of catastrophes, but
can also cause derivative manmade catastrophes.4 Thus, these questions touch not
only economic choices, but their moral consequences.
The problem of insurance and risk distribution is both a private activity and
a public function. 5 In specific areas, such as flooding and terrorism, the
government provides insurance and compensation. 6 A public role is necessary
because, it is believed, private insurance alone cannot bear the risk of extreme
loss. The collection of tax revenue is broad and indiscriminant as to one’s risk
exposure and appetite to bear it, and the distribution of public funds is subject to a
complex mix of perceived need, sympathy, and politics that is neither entirely
consistent nor predictable. The democratization of risk distribution is a prominent
aspect of catastrophic risk and loss management.
This chapter explores the limitations of the private and public risk
distribution and compensation schemes. The experiences of 9/11 and Katrina
provide the context for the discussion of this theme. This chapter argues that
traditional insurance and government compensation are often inadequate, and that
an alternative mechanism of private risk distribution is needed. An alternative
scheme may mean the disintermediation of the traditional insurance and
government functions, and a move towards more direct market transactions
between those who are exposed to risk and those participants who are willing to
bear it. Disintermediation may better spread risk, reduce the secondary cost of
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dislocation, and incentivize proper mitigation measures. The result would not only
be more efficient from an economic point of view but also be more just and fair.
Era of Mega-Catastrophes
Throughout much of human history, catastrophes have been blamed on bad
luck or the distemper of gods. But catastrophes are not simply a matter of
fortune’s winds. Human choices play a significant role in the causality and
consequence of catastrophes. The most obvious example of a frequently recurring
manmade catastrophe is war. Beyond this, society lives and builds in the path of
hurricanes, on coastlines and geological faults. Whereas the ancients lacked the
knowledge to understand the risk around them, 7 modern society has a deep
appreciation of the dangers associated with many of its activities.
In the twilight of the twentieth century, the frequency and severity of
catastrophes surged. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck the Florida coast and
caused insured losses of approximately $21 billion.8 At the time, it was the largest
loss from a single event in insurance history. In the same year, the Irish Republic
Army bombed central London and caused $671 million in insurance losses,
foreshadowing a more virulent form of terrorism. 9 In 1994, the Northridge
earthquake inflicted insured losses of approximately $17 billion,10 and $43 billion
in economic losses. 11 In 1995, the Kobe earthquake caused $147 billion in
economic losses, 12 at the time perhaps the most costly natural catastrophe in
modern history. 13 Since insurance penetration in Kobe was shallow, only $4
billion was insured loss.14
The unprecedented catastrophes of the 1990s portended a new century of
mega-catastrophes. On September 11, 2001, the terrorists attack caused about $80
billion in direct economic loss,15 of which about $34 billion was insured.16 The
event was the largest insurance loss from a single event. On December 26, 2004,
the South Asia tsunami killed approximately 280,000, becoming one of the
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deadliest natural catastrophes in the modern era. On August, 29, 2005, Katrina
inflicted about $200 billion in damages and 1700 deaths.17 Currently insurance
litigation is working through the legal system, but the private insurance loss (not
including insurance loss from the National Flood Insurance Program) is estimated
to be over $40 billion, which would surpass that of 9/11.18 Both 9/11 and Katrina
were 1/100 year events. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire is the closest
comparable: Katrina because of the scale of destruction to a major American city,
and 9/11 because of the impact on the insurance industry from a single event.19
What has accounted for this destructive surge? Bad luck cannot be
discounted. It was bad luck that Katrina was a direct blow to New Orleans rather
than a glancing one, and that the intelligence and law enforcement agencies failed
to foil the terrorist plot. But bad luck is simply a matter of timing, just as the “Big
One” will eventually strike the West Coast. A part of the answer is that
catastrophes are more severe because tropical storms have become more frequent
and severe. Also, severity of catastrophe is a function of value at risk. In this
regard, economic asset values have increased. There is a continuing concentration
of population and economic assets in large urban and coastal areas.20 And after a
century of catastrophic wars and the apocalyptic possibilities of the Cold War, the
lesson learned is that human life and welfare are most precious. There is more
value at risk, making the same catastrophe more severe.
Human hands can not only unleash enormous catastrophes such as the worst
case scenarios of global warming or nuclear detonation, but they can amplify the
consequences of natural risks. Even when causality cannot be influenced, human
choices can magnify or mitigate the destructive pulses of fortune.21 Consider the
fact that natural disasters with the greatest fatalities tend to be in less developed
countries whose political economy may be incapable of adequately mitigating
risk. 22 While the occurrence of a natural catastrophe may be fortuitous, risk
spreading and mitigation are uniquely human activities.
Katrina provides a good case study. The hurricane was an independent event,
but the catastrophe occurred as a result of the consequences of a long chain of
human decisions. Since the earliest settlement in New Orleans, residents knew
that the land mass was subject to flooding. In 1965, Congress authorized the
construction of the levee system.23 The government could have built the levees to
withstand a category 5 hurricane. But ultimately the system was built to withstand
17
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a storm approximately equivalent to a fast-moving category 3 hurricane.24 It was
believed that such a storm strikes coastal Louisiana once every 200 years.25 With
the clarity of hindsight and the realization of global warming, this estimate has
proven to be erroneous. Since the 1970s the frequency of category 4 and 5
hurricanes and the destructiveness of tropical storms have doubled. 26 This
experience suggests that the original probability estimate was wrong. Of course
this is hindsight bias, and the point is not that the original assumption was wrong
since no one can predict weather patterns 40 years into the future. Rather, no
allowance was made for the possibility of error. The 1/200 year assessment
reflected the best guess probability, suggesting that the government accepted the
risk that in any given year the city had a 0.5 percent chance of a catastrophic
breach. In light of the difficulty of longterm weather prediction, the possibility of
error, and the magnitude of harm from error, the decision to set the engineering
standard at a 1/200 year event was fatally shortsighted. Katrina need not have
killed thousands of Americans; it need not have destroyed billions of dollars of
assets; it need not have flooded a major American city. Arguably, the “original
sin” (so to speak) dates back to the decision to settle in a flood prone land, but
recent government decisions on risk management dating back to 1965 are the
most direct proximate cause of the mega-catastrophe. Katrina, the hurricane, was
a natural event, but Katrina, the disaster, was certainly manmade.
Katrina illustrates the paradox of modern society. The understanding of risk
in the modern era has rapidly developed: the geological and meteorological
dynamics that trigger natural catastrophes, the laws of probability and risk, the
underwriting of fortuitous risk, and the risk of markets and political economy.
Advances in technology, awareness of risks, regulation and tort law, and greater
sensitivity to loss have reduced many of the ordinary risks of living life in a
complex world: transportation and consumer products are safer, healthcare is
better, diseases have been neutralized, and workplace accidents are less frequent.
Despite these advances, the frequency and severity of catastrophes have increased.
Technology promotes welfare, but also harbors potentially dangerous risks.
Industrialization provides cheap goods, but pollutes the environment. Nuclear
power provides cleaner energy, but also poses a source of accidents or abuse.
Genetically modified foods and nanotechnology better our lives, but may also
pose hidden dangers. More innovations, yet unheard of or presently fantastical in
concept, will rapidly follow as the growth of technology is geometric. Greater
complexity begets greater means of breakdown. 27 Mega-catastrophic terrorism is
24
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real. Global warming, debatable only a few years ago, is a generally accepted
phenomenon with uncertain consequences in the future. Rapid increase in human
population stresses biodiversity. Population and economic assets continue to
concentrate in mega-cities, many of which are in the path of natural catastrophes
and prey to terrorism. The possibility of a technological mishap cannot be
discounted. No one can foretell whether any of these risks will manifest into
future mega-catastrophes.28 It is also doubtful whether these risks are somehow
quantifiable for the purposes of the all ubiquitous cost-benefit analysis.29
Ultimately, Katrina and 9/11 may well be once-in-a-lifetime disasters, iconic
in stature and thus unique in the annals of history. This is the sanguine perspective.
A more realistic view is that Katrina and 9/11 are harbingers of a new era of
mega-catastrophes. Although all the factors of causality and consequence are not
subject to control, the task at hand is to properly manage risk. The goals are three:
mitigate risk, which entails the deterrence of costly behavior; spread risk so that
the secondary costs of economic dislocation are reduced; minimize the transaction
cost of risk spreading and compensation delivery.30
Sources of Compensation
Tort System. — In times of mega-catastrophes, compensation through the
tort system is infeasible and undesirable. It is true that mass torts, typically arising
from the occurrence of a large single accident or the release of a defective product
into the marketplace, are frequently litigated. Despite the limitations of litigation,
primarily the time delay and the costs of resolution,31 the tort system adequately
administers most disputes arising from accidents. Tort law works best when there
is a clear transaction between the parties, blameworthiness is within the realm of
reasonable debate, causation is clear, and credit risk is low. Although there are
delays in compensation and high transaction costs relative to insurance or an ex
post compensation fund, these costs constitute the price of accessing the civil
and 135,000 jobs; and the power failure that blacked out the northeast United States on August 14,
2003 caused a $75–$100 million loss from food spoilage alone. Christian Brauner, Swiss Re, The
Risk Landscape of the Future 15 (2004).
28
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dispute resolution system. Mass torts may raise public policy considerations, such
as concerns for public safety and financial distress to industry, but they are in
essence private disputes of right and wrong to be resolved among the parties.
In the case of a mega-catastrophe, these considerations typically do not hold.
The concepts of fault and liability lose much of their plausibility. By definition,
extreme catastrophes are extremely unlikely events. They may be foreseeable just
as an asteroid strike or a global pandemic are foreseeable, but such foresight may
not suffice for liability. Often, catastrophes are simply a matter of bad luck and
perfection of precaution against all perils has never been the standard of care in
the fault system.32 Even with a plausible case for liability, most private defendants
would be judgment proof. It is a limitation of tort law that as damage assessment
against a defendant reaches a threshold, the well of remedy begins to run dry,
either because of the limited resources of the defendant or because the law refuses
to impose liability that may cripple a socially necessary asset.33 The extreme form
of this problem is terrorism by stateless organizations. In the case of a judgment
proof defendant, victims must find an alternative source of blame and deep
pockets, which ironically may make a case for liability less plausible. From the
perspective of a mass class of victims, the most credit-worthy defendant is a
public entity. Federal and state governments, however, may have vigorous
defenses, making compensation highly uncertain.
In most extreme catastrophes, the identity of the wrongdoer and the question
of negligence are often speculative. Consider the case of 9/11. There would have
been no recourse against the terrorists. Victims would have had to look to other
defendants—perhaps the airlines, the landlords, and the government—but
obviously the question of negligence would have been far from clear, resulting in
uncertainty that would have required years of litigation. 34 Questions of duty,
breach of care, and causation would have been substantial. Consider also the case
of Katrina. The hurricane was a fortuitous event, but the government’s negligence
in managing the crisis caused substantial injuries. 35 Any claim of negligence,
however, face substantial constitutional, statutory and common law tort barriers to
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recovery. 36 Compensation through the tort system is highly uncertain,
unpredictable, and costly, and the tort system is typically the least efficient means
of compensation. 37 The uncertainty and delay may exacerbate economic
dislocation and increase secondary cost. In sum, the tort system is not ideal when
liability is potentially remote, source of remedy is limited, and social cost of delay
is high.38
Private Insurance. — Without the tort system, the old triumvirate of
insurance, victim, and government bears the brunt of the losses. The availability
of private insurance is subject to several limitations. It is, of course, a creature of
contract, and thus an ex ante agreement is a predicate to compensation. The
voluntary nature of contract influences the demand side of the insurance equation.
Insurance penetration may be too shallow to provide adequate compensation.
Homeowner’s policies routinely exclude flood and earthquake insurance, and
coverage for these hazards must be bought separately. Even in the area of life and
health insurance, demand is not universal. Insurance penetration is a function of
wealth as, outside of mandatory coverage, insurance is a discretionary spending
item. The experience of 9/11 showed that a compensation fund was deemed
necessary to substantially augment life insurance, even for a large segment of the
population who worked in the lucrative field of financial services; 39 and the
experience of Katrina showed that the penetration of flood insurance was not
pervasive, even for a city whose land mass was below sea level. Moreover, the
impact of a catastrophe is not shared equally. In times of crisis, the class of people
most affected is the poor because they tend to be underinsured. The experience of
the South Asia tsunami tragically illustrates this disparate effect: the disaster was
one of the worst natural catastrophes in history, and yet the insurance losses were
rather minimal in relation to the scale of the calamity.40
On the supply side, the capital supporting the property and casualty market
is limited.41 The insurance industry can bear up to the region of $100 billion loss
from a single event without a systemic failure. 42 Coverage for large scale
36
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industry’s surplus stood at $347 billion at year-end 2003.”); R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce Deal, The
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$347 billion of surplus in the U.S. P/C sector was devoted to commercial lines).
42
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catastrophes such as terrorism, earthquake, flooding, and hurricanes are limited in
the private insurance market, and such coverage is frequently supplemented by
government funds. In its current configuration the private market has difficulty
with underwriting extreme risks. 43 The reasons are complex, but they can be
summarized as follows: catastrophic risk is difficult to model and thus insurers
incorporate an appropriate risk premium into the price; American tax laws are
unfavorable to the accumulation of an adequate reserve against an infrequent
extreme event; and the small possibility of a large event requires an insurer to
hold sufficient capital to protect against insolvency in any given year, and the
capital held must generate a sufficient investment return such that capital costs
drive premiums towards economic infeasibility.44
Lastly, the pricing of insurance is most cost efficient when the risk is
characterized by high frequency of event and low severity of loss, such as
automobile accidents and ordinary liability insurance. When the risk is low
frequency and high severity, the typical profile of a catastrophe, or when other
factors militate against insurability, such as flooding and nuclear accident,
traditional insurance is often unavailable or expensive. The unpredictability of the
aggregate risk pool requires a large risk premium that is commensurate with the
capital that must be held to ensure solvency, and this risk premium may result in
economic infeasibility of premiums, which would further drive down the demand
for insurance.
Collectively, these economic dynamics and financial limitations suggest that
tradition insurance leaves large gaps in the provision of compensation in times of
extraordinary loss. It is only a partial solution to the problem.
Public Insurance. — Private insurance and the tort system are limited, and
victims cannot internalize the entirety of the loss without injustice and substantial
secondary costs. Accordingly, government compensation is important. It can be
delivered through an ex ante subsidized insurance program, such as the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) and the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968,
or through an ex post compensation scheme, such as the September 11 Victim
Compensation Fund. Although government must always be involved in times of
national or regional crisis, public distribution of risk and loss has been
problematic in both ex ante and ex post programs.
First consider public insurance programs. These programs are not influenced
by ordinary market dynamics. One result is that public insurance tends to crowd
out private insurance or anesthetize market developments.45 The TRIA is a good
example. It is a temporary cost-sharing program that provides the insurance
industry a federal backstop for extreme losses from terrorism. It was enacted with
two stated purposes: to address “market disruptions and ensure the continued
insolvencies as well as market price and availability problems.”). Given that the industry holds
more capital than it did in 2001, this threshold is probably higher now.
43
See Paul R. Kleindorfer & Howard C. Kunreuther, Challenges Facing the Insurance
Industry in Managing Catastrophic Risks, FINANCING OF CATASTROPHIC RISK, supra note 20, at
149-94.
44
See Rhee, Terrorism Risk, supra note 19, at 464-78.
45
See id. at 491.
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widespread availability and affordability” of insurance, and to “allow for a
transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, resume pricing of such
insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future losses.”46 Because the program
was envisioned as a temporary price stabilization measure, it was enacted with a
legislative life of three years. In the three years of the program, the insurance
market stabilized; insurers raised more capital to replace the capital lost from the
attacks; terrorism risk insurance became widely available with stabilized
premiums and an increasing competitive market; and the general economy
recovered from the initial shock. 47 These are good developments, but it is
questionable whether the TRIA influenced them in any meaningful way.48 Worse,
the TRIA could have done more harm than good. The major problem is that
“there has been little development or movement among insurers or reinsurers
toward developing a private-sector mechanism that could provide capacity,
without government involvement, to absorb losses from terrorist events.” 49
Instead, the insurance industry’s view of a permanent solution appears to “a longterm, public-private partnership,” 50 meaning a longterm extension of a federal
cost-sharing program. Thus far, the industry lobby has been successful. Despite
price and economic stability, the government enacted the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Extension Act of 2005, which modified and extended TRIA for another
two years. Government insurance has created an expectation of corporate
entitlement, which anesthetizes the need for a private insurance solution.51 Unless
the program is allowed to expire at the end of 2007, a federal backstop may well
be on its way to becoming a permanent public insurance fixture, though that
clearly was not the government’s original intent.52
Government insurance programs are also susceptible to bad management. A
single department within an agency typically manages an insurance program.
“These micro-agencies, subject only to bureaucratic oversight, cannot compete
with the private market, which is subject to the collective forces of supply and
demand, innovation and strategy, and incentives and disincentives.” 53 The
46
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National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is a good example. The problem begins
with underwriting. Flooding constitutes 90% of all natural disasters in the US.54
Like a nuclear accident, flooding is such a highly correlative risk that private
insurers exclude coverage, leaving property owners three choices: internalize the
loss, eliminate the risk by vacating or selling the property, or take mitigation
measures.55 In 1968, Congress changed this dynamic when it enacted the program.
Flood insurance has proven to be a poorly executed, bad idea.56 The problem starts
with subsidization: “The program, by design, is not actuarially sound because
Congress authorized subsidized insurance rates to be made available for policies
covering some properties to encourage communities to join the program.” 57
Premiums represent about 35% to 40% of the actuarial risk, resulting in a program
that is not financially independent and that largely subsidizes actual risk.58 This is
not surprising as public insurance programs have tended to be ex ante disaster
relief cloaked in insurance terms.59
The cost-benefit analysis is not encouraging. The government saves one
dollar in ex post disaster relief for every three dollars of flood insurance claims
paid.60 Why sustain an ex ante insurance program when an ex post compensation
plan is available? The government’s answer is that through its risk management
and mitigation efforts the program saves about one billion dollars in flood damage
each year. 61 But this figure is misleading because it is unknown whether the
projected losses would have occurred without the program. Losses are influenced
by the existence of subsidized flood insurance; without it, economic forces and
rational incentives would have driven out many owners of high risk properties. A
true cost-benefit analysis can be done only if these factors are decoupled. Thus,
some of the claimed “savings” must surely be costs in disguise.
Underwriting aside, the management of the program has been problematic.
Only about 40 employees and 170 contractors the Federal Emergency
Management Agency manage the entire flood insurance program.62 The program
has 4.6 million policyholders in about 20,000 communities, and it has paid about
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$14.6 billion in claims as of August 2005.63 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita added
another $15 to $25 billion in claims.64 Obviously, the program is vast and the
financials suggest that the entire program could constitute a major business
component of a publicly traded insurance company. Absent substantially more
resources, the program cannot be effectively managed. The agency outsources the
day-to-day management responsibilities to the private sector. About 95% of in
force policies are written by private insurance agents representing about 95
private insurance companies that issue policies and adjust claims.65 These insurers,
called “write-your-own companies,” receive about a third of the premium income
and remit the remainder to the government.66 They also receive about 3.3% of the
incurred losses as compensation for claims adjustment services. 67 Thus private
insurers, which bear no underwritten risk, profit more from the program if they
issue more policies and incur more losses. As one would expect, the program
suffers from adverse selection problems. Repetitive loss properties, which account
for only 1% of insured properties, comprise 25% to 30% of claims.68 Repetitive
loss is indicative of adverse selection, and the root cause is grounded in a policy
requiring only high risk properties to obtain insurance.69 FEMA is charged with
assuring a minimum level of quality control in the program, but the oversight of
private insurers has been problematic. 70 The agency’s quality control methods
have been found to lack “statistical validity,” meaning that in conducting its
insurance function the agency does not have the information needed “to have
reasonable assurance that program objectives are being achieved.” 71 Thus, the
process of information acquisition and analysis—the most vital function of a wellrun insurance company—is unreliable, suggesting that the government agency is a
rather poor assessor of risk.
If the problem with government insurance is just a matter of wealth transfer,
the issue is simply a policy question on the appropriate use of public funds. One
can argue that public funds should be used precisely to protect people who have
been subject to a tragedy. But the calculus is not so simple. By creating moral
hazards and incentive, government programs may amplify risk. Consider this
curious fact: although the mortality rate from natural catastrophes has been
declining in the twentieth century, deaths from floods have actually increased in
the latter half of the twentieth century.72 Katrina is consistent with this deadly
trend. The increased death toll coincides with substantial efforts by the
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government to manage flood risk, which includes the NFIP and the New Orleans
levee construction project. The suggestion is not that there is direct causation
between increased deaths and government action, but putting more people in the
path of floods, even when the risks are said to be mitigated, must be an
influencing factor.73 These dynamics have disparate effects along socioeconomic
divisions. Because the poor have little economic choice in habitation, they bear
the brunt of the costs associated with the destructive cycle of habitation, flooding
and rehabitation.74 The intended risk mitigation has not come to pass; quite the
opposite, the government flood program has incentivized the habitation and
building in hazardous areas, putting more lives and assets at risk and raising the
cost of ex post disaster assistance.
Public Compensation. — Bad incentives are also created by ex post
government compensation schemes. The problem of the “Samaritan’s Dilemma”
is well known.75 When there is a history of public compensation in response to a
catastrophe, the precedent sets rational expectation. This expectation changes
behavior—people may assume more risk than they would ordinarily take, not
purchase insurance, or otherwise not mitigate risks as they would if they had to
internalize the loss. Consider the case of 9/11. The government provided
substantial compensation to victims. Individual victims were not the only
beneficiaries of public funds. Businesses, large and small, too received substantial
financial assistance, including protection from tort liability. Collectively, these
benefits have set expectations and influenced risk-taking behavior. This has been
confirmed by a congressionally mandated report, which concluded that the
purchase of terrorism insurance has remained low due in part to the expectation
that the government would bail out hard hit businesses.76
In addition to the moral hazard problem, the provision and amount of
government relief are difficult to predict. Government action is often subject to a
mix of political motivations, public sentiment, and the perceived need for
economic stabilization, which may or may not be accurate.77 This is illustrated by
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a comparison of 9/11 and Katrina. In the case of 9/11 victims, the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund was established within a matter of days. The fund
paid out on average $2.08 million per claim, and a total payout of about $5.13
billion. 78 The scale of this scheme is unprecedented. The Katrina victims,
however, received no comparable benefit. The reason for the difference in
treatment is a complex brew.79 In the case of 9/11, there were viable tort actions
against the airlines, and a political compromise to shield the industry may have
motivated the creation of the fund. The terrorist attack was a war-like incursion
into American soil, and patriotism and broad sympathy for the national sacrifice
influenced the political decision. On the other hand, despite the gross negligence
of the government in handling the crisis, Katrina was a natural event, and thus
sympathy for the victims did not encompass the notion that the victims were
sacrificed in the course of some larger struggle. No private industry is at systemic
risk from tort liability, and tort recourse against the government would be
extremely difficult. Lastly, the socioeconomic statuses of the victims are different.
Many of the 9/11 victims worked in Wall Street, arguably the most important
American industry, and were by in large in the upper stratum of American society.
Katrina victims, on the other hand, were largely the poor, as is the case in most
flooding deaths. The disparities in socioeconomic status and political clout and
the resulting political action cannot be discounted. Thus, both 9/11 and Katrina
killed thousands of victims, and yet the approaches to ex post compensation are
markedly different.
Government compensation is problematic because politics is at its core. The
perception of catastrophe is relative. For the victim, the scale and nature of the
catastrophe matters not. For society, they matter in triggering the collective sense
of sympathy and social obligation. For government, they matter for reasons of
politics and economics. The shifting sands of public compensation raise the issue
of arbitrariness and fairness. Why is compensation subject to the perception and
sentiment of the collective whole? For victims, at least, there is not a satisfactory
answer to this question other than it is the nature of the political process, which is
not always rational or efficient.
Government compensation as a form of political action can be good or bad
or both. It is difficult to be more precise than this generic, perhaps trite, statement
for the assessment of the quality of the action is situational and each disaster may
pose unique challenges. Furthermore, it is difficult to expect a purely principled
approach to political action when its essence is one of collective compromise
subject to the sometimes unpredictable interactions of various interest groups and
conflicting principles. There is always the danger of unintended consequences,
and relief cannot always be expected in times of crisis. In spite of these concerns,
it is inappropriate to categorically reject ex post government action for the use of
public funds is a vital component of compensation in times of national crisis. To
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argue against this process is impractical and, one could argue, ignores the
democratic process inherent in the distribution of wealth per public grace. Thus,
there should always be a government option to intervene.
Participation and Disintermediation
An effective risk distribution scheme requires two predicates. First is broad
participation, and the second is minimization of cost. With respect to the first
predicate, the participation of private insurance and government suggests that the
risk is widely distributed to shareholders and taxpayers. The insurance industry is
large in absolute dollar value, constituting approximately 8% of the global GDP.80
Nevertheless, the amount of capital supporting catastrophic loss is limited in
comparison to the potential loss. A loss of $100 billion, for example, would
greatly stress the entire system, and yet a single event surpassing such a
benchmark is easily foreseeable.
Traditional insurance is not only limited in scale, but surprising limited in
scope. In addition to the burden of catastrophic fortuitous risk, individuals and
families also bear most longterm economic risks. 81 Economic risks such as
devaluation of one’s home and profession, major risks in daily life, are not
insurable in the market today.82 Fortuitous risk is only a small segment of the
potential risk, and only a fraction of our wealth, those being interest in
corporations, are commoditized and traded. 83 The participatory limitation of
traditional insurance has prompted Robert Shiller to propose a radical
reconfiguration of the financial and insurance markets wherein information
markets are developed and new products quantify and package various economics
risks to be traded and spread among a global risk pool. Although Shiller addressed
only economic risks, the concern over the limitation of participation applies
equally to catastrophic risk as well.
In contrast to the insurance market, the tax base is far broader in terms of
participation. The scale and scope of participation is limited only by the tax base
and public borrowing. Whenever there is public compensation, the public shares
the financial burden of catastrophes. In this sense, the risk and cost are broadly
distributed through the political mechanism, which is the default intermediary for
the distribution of funds. As catastrophes become more frequent and severe, one
would expect that private insurance, at least in its traditional form, would retreat
and that government compensation, supported by broad political participation,
would fill the void, absent some fundamental reconfiguration of the private
insurance market or government’s role in the management of catastrophic risk.
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The second predicate requires that transaction cost be minimized. Cost has
multiple facets. There is, of course, the cost of executing the risk transfer, which
in the case the traditional insurance policy is the expense and profit of the insurer.
Because capital is limited, the resulting risk premium often makes catastrophic
insurance coverage expensive or economically infeasible. This is a cost of
financing. Additionally, there is the cost incurred from the failure to mitigate or
avoid risk. A major concern here is the problem of freeriders and the resulting
expectation of bailout. A risk pool works well if all participants are susceptible to
varying degree to the same risk; thus each participant agrees to underwrite the risk
of others in consideration for the same. If, however, one is not susceptible to the
same risk but made to pay, he subsidizes the cost of the risk. The freerider
problem is apparent in the area of catastrophic risk. The most obvious risks of
extreme catastrophes—earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorism—are not evenly
distributed or commonly shared. Large segments of the society are simply not
exposed to one or more of these risks. 84 Thus, the Samaritan’s Dilemma and
government induced distortions in behavior towards risk mitigation and avoidance
are problematic.
In the ideal world, private parties would contract to distribution risk among
themselves, leaving the allocation of cost to the discipline of market pricing. In a
smoothly operating market with adequate supply of capital, moral hazards are
minimized and parties are properly incentivized to efficiently mitigate risk. This
ideal is advanced if the number of participants in the private sector is increased,
thus increasing capacity, and if the cost of transfer is reduced, thus allowing
greater participation. Both the private market and the government can play vital
roles in expanding the capital base that would allow more effective distribution of
risk. Obviously the problem is complex and there are many plausible strategies.
The discussion here is limited to alternative risk transfer, disintermediation of risk
agency, and catastrophe tax policy.
As a result of the surge in catastrophes, the insurance and financial markets
have developed alternatives to traditional risk management techniques as a way to
expand insurance capacity and make the pricing of catastrophic risk more
efficient. The alternative risk transfer (ART) market integrates the insurance and
financial markets to provide capital markets based solutions.85 The market allows
capital market participants to directly participate in the underlying risk. The most
significant ART product is insurance securitization, which is in essence a
84
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collateralized reinsurance obligation in the form of a structured note.86 Instead of
executing a standard treaty with a reinsurer, the insurer cedes all or a portion of
the premium to a special purpose reinsurance vehicle (SPRV). The SPRV then
issues a bond, which covers any liabilities from the reinsurance agreement. The
bond proceeds are deposited into a collateral trust, and its assets serve as a
guarantee for the SPRV’s reinsurance obligation. The bond investor’s return is
measured as a spread over the risk-free rate, and ceded premium funds this spread.
Thus, in an insurance securitization, the bond market becomes the reinsurer of the
underlying risk.
There is growing interest in Cat bonds. The reasons are several: hardening
prices in the reinsurance market; a demand for fully collateralized protection to
minimize counterparty credit risk; growing interest by hedge funds devoted to
alternative investments; the need for additional capital; and the need of
institutional investors to diversify their portfolios. In an era of global warming
and more volatile weather patterns, securitization may take a broader role in
spreading risk. Thus far, however, Cat bonds constitute a fraction of the available
capital. 87 Since their inception in the mid-1990s, they were slow to develop. The
reinsurance market was in a soft price cycle for much of the 1990s and thus
traditional reinsurance was cheaper than securitization. The cyclical nature of
reinsurance alone does not explain the slow growth. The stunted growth is also
attributable to regulatory problems: uncertainties of the accounting treatment of
SPRVs and regulatory framework, a lack of a “pass through” tax treatment, and
an underdeveloped information market on natural catastrophes that limit the size
of the investment community. 88 These limitations have driven the Cat bond
market offshore, where few regulatory burdens exist, favorable tax treatment is
given, and a pool of sophisticated investors are willing to undertake catastrophe
risk for superior returns. For insurance securitization to grow, these regulatory
uncertainties and tax policy impediments must be removed.89
The thrust of the ART market is to expand the number of participants in the
distribution of risk. By doing this, the market increases the supply of insurance.
Securitization disintermediates the insurer and directly connects policyholder to
capital provider.90 No longer is the risk transfer from policyholder to insurer, but

86

The transaction structure is similar to traditional securitization, but with some important
differences. See Tamar Frankel & Joseph W. LaPlume, Securitizing Insurance Risk, 19 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 203, 205 (2000).
87
See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Catastrophic Insurance Risks: Status of Efforts to
Securitize Natural Catastrophe and Terrorism Risk 14 (2003) (“[O]utstanding catastrophe bonds
accounted for only 2.5% to 3.0% of worldwide catastrophe reinsurance coverage.”); Rainer
Helfenstein & Thomas Holzheu, Swiss Re, Sigma No.7/2006, Securitization—New Opportunities
for Insurers and Investors, at 24 (2006) (total outstanding volume of Cat bonds is about $23
billion).
88
See Rhee, Terrorism Risk, supra note 19, at 500-05.
89
See id. at 511-22.
90
The disintermediation is not complete for insurers are still required to originate the
policies and service them. Moreover, most bonds are underwritten on a nonindemnity basis,
meaning that liability is triggered by an agreed index rather than the actual loss. Thus the primary

17-20

risk is directly transferred to capital providers. Importantly, the participants in the
ART market, like insurance companies, are sophisticated institutions only. Cat
bonds are privately placed, not publicly issued. The risk is perceived to be so
exotic that only institutional investors have a sophistication to undertake it. Thus,
the market is limited.
The concept of disintermediation in the private insurance market also raises
the possibility of its application to the public sector. The government is the agent
through which the public participates in catastrophic risk distribution. Like the
way an insurer allocates the capital of its shareholders, the government allocates
public funds. Unlike an insurer, however, it is a poor assessor of risk and its
actions sometimes creates more costs than benefits. It is not subject to market
forces, and has less incentive to develop information necessary to assess risk and
to properly distribute it. Similar to the process of securitization, a scheme that
disintermediates the government should be a part of the public debate. One can
imagine a scheme that would allow individuals to invest capital directly in
insurable assets within some form of a public framework.
Why does catastrophic risk distribution require the insurer or the
government as intermediaries? The simple answer is that both are aggregators of
capital. The insurance industry is justified by efficiently aggregating capital and
thereby diversifying risk. This is consistent with the prevailing theory of the firm,
which says that the firm reduces the transaction cost associated with conducting
business. 91 The theory holds in virtually all complex enterprises. Where
transaction costs can be reduced, the market has found ways to exploit
efficiencies. The economic rationale of securitization is that it provides a lower
cost of fund for the underlying transaction generating the securitized asset than a
firm’s cost of capital.92 In other words, the bond investor requires less return on
capital than the investor in the firm that would otherwise originate and hold the
securitized asset. Thus, securitization exists because the aggregation of capital in
the firm is less efficient than a direct transaction with capital providers.
Likewise, the government is the intermediary only because it is the default
aggregator of public capital and thus has a monopoly on the distribution of public
funds. Public insurance and compensation programs are costly to taxpayers and
impose secondary costs arising from the distortions they impart on the market and
individual behavior. The ideal public risk distribution scheme would entail not
only broader participation, but also more direct participation in the risk pool.
Direct participation would acquire more attributes of market transactions. Those
exposed to catastrophic risk, which is to say a large segment of the population,
pay a premium to transfer the risk to the pool, and thus the compensation scheme
becomes more like private insurance and less like ex post public compensation.
What would public disintermediation look like? Some speculation is
required, of course, since no such scheme exists. The following is one possible
insurer and reinsurer may still be exposed to basis risk. See Rhee, Terrorism Risk, supra note 19,
at 503.
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structure. With the help of the insurance industry, insurable assets subject to
catastrophic risk are aggregated into diversified pools of assets. As a simple
example, consider a pool of residential homes or commercial real estate from
different parts of the country. The important concept here is diversification of
assets at risk so that no single event can inflict a highly correlative loss on a
limited number of risk bearers. Reinsurance achieves some diversification, but the
insurance industry would underwrite the assets with the view of transferring a
substantial quantity of risk to a public bond market. Participating insurers and
reinsurers, however, would be required to retain a portion of the risk to avoid
moral hazard problems. Individual and institutional investors may invest in the
bonds, similar to an investment in Treasury bonds, subject to limitations of
investment amount and credit quality of the bonds for individuals. Even with
broader participation on the demand side of capital, there may still be an
insufficient supply of capital. There may still be a large spread between market
price and actuarial risk. Any shortfall in yield to investors can be made up with
public funds added as a “sweetener.” These sweeteners can be in the form of a tax
exemption or a direct contribution to investment return. Thus, a hybrid publicprivate risk market is created.
The power of the purse is the power to change behavior. If the above
process results in more affordable insurance, it is possible to incentivize people to
participate through the tax system. Thus far, there has not been a concerted effort
to combine tax policy and catastrophe management into a scheme to distribute,
manage and mitigate risk. The most basic tax policy is based on the principle that
income is taxed, and not risk exposure. The tax system, however, can be used to
collect revenue based on projected costs of compensation per region and
recoupment of monies spent. The concern here is one of fairness and efficiency.
The allocation of public funds to provide compensation such as flood insurance or
losses from terrorism is disproportionate. A better matching of source and use of
funds is not only fairer, but also reduces the problem of subsidization. The
suggestion is not individualized assessment as is the case in taxation of individual
income, but rather a more specific assessment that may be characterized by
geography or risk profile.
Tax policy can also be used to provide credits to those who have sufficient
insurance or penalties for those who do not. A more benign perspective is that tax
policy can incentivize investment. The primary example that comes to mind is the
mortgage interest deduction. Home ownership is deemed a good thing, and
likewise protection of the home from fortuitous risk is a good investment. In this
regard, there are two basic questions: Is there a sufficient supply of economically
feasible insurance? If so, are those exposed to catastrophic risk adequately
participating? Tax policy can affect the answers to both questions. If there is an
adequate supply—a prerequisite for moving away from ad hoc compensation and
towards true insurance—tax policy can be more than a means of collecting
revenue based on income. The tax system can be an effective tool in promoting
risk distributive behavior through a system of insurance credits and penalties.
The concept of disintermediation, both in the private market and public
finance, has the potential to change the risk landscape. The private market has

19-20

been forced to innovate as a result of the trend towards more frequent and severe
catastrophes and the stress placed on the traditional insurance system. These same
forces are also placing a strain on the public compensation system. What would
be the outcome if a category 5 hurricane hit Miami and a magnitude 8.0
earthquake hit San Francisco, resulting in economic losses of half a trillion dollars
in the same year? How will the government handle such a calamity? One would
expect massive infusion of public funds to pay victims and to rebuild the cities.
This action would be appropriate and just, but if the vast majority of victims had
been underinsured for flooding and earthquake one would surely question whether
a more effective and just system could have delivered compensation. In the ideal
world, those who are exposed to catastrophic risk ought to have paid into a risk
pool an amount commensurate with the risk. This assumes that insurance was
available and affordable, and the predicates are broad participation and reduced
transaction cost. Such a reconfigured insurance system, based on a hybrid publicprivate infrastructure, would instill the proper incentives and avoid the freerider
and expectation problems. Thus, the question of fairness and efficiency in public
compensation and private insurance are inextricably linked.
Conclusion
One would be hardly alone in predicting that catastrophes in the future will
be more frequent and severe. With the experience of the 1990s and the first
decade of the new century, the insurance industry has already accepted this
premise as an operating condition. Increasing volatility of human and economic
losses will continue to strain the current compensation schemes. A more effective
participation in a risk society is needed. Two important conditions are the need to
increase the pool of participants and to decrease the cost of participation. The
financial and insurance markets have adapted to rapid changes in the risk
landscape and have invented alternative risk transfer techniques to deal with the
special problems. These techniques are relatively new, but growing. Regulations
and tax policies can be reformed to further facilitate the growth.
The government’s role in catastrophe management should not stop there.
Policy should work from the principle that distortions in incentives should be
limited. This calls for a reexamination of the approaches to ex ante and ex post
compensation. In the longterm, the government can explore ways to facilitate a
disintermediation of the insurer and the government. The suggestion is not that
they are or should be made superfluous. Far from it, they are vital to the overall
scheme of risk mitigation and distribution. Rather, the suggestion is the modest
proposition that every member of society can and should be an active participant
in a risk pool, and that more direct participation would reduce the cost of risk
transfer. This is the promise of disintermediation. In the private market, it has
been realized by the tremendous growth of the asset securitization market, of
which the growing market for insurance securitization is just a tiny fraction. In the
arena of public finance, the government still remains the default aggregator of
capital. The goal, then, is to construct a scheme that allows these market-based
transactions to occur within the framework of insurance and government.

20-20

